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Abstract
In June 1995, the Swedish parliament decided to cut the replacement rate in
unemployment insurance from 80 percent to 75 percent, a change that took
effect on January 1, 1996. This paper examines how this change affected job
finding rates among unemployed insured individuals. To identify the effect of the
policy we exploit a quasi-experimental feature of the benefit cut: only a fraction
of the unemployed was affected by the reduction in replacement rates. We
compare the evolution of job finding rates before and after the reform among
those affected and those not affected. Our estimates suggest that the reform
caused an increase in the transition rate of roughly 10 percent. There is also
evidence of anticipatory behavior among the unemployed; the effects of the
reform seem to operate several months  before its actual implementation in
January 1996.
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Sweden was hit by mass unemployment at a later stage than most other European 
countries. By 1990, the unemployment rate stood at 1.6 percent; by 1993 it had increased 
to 8.2 percent. The decline in employment-to-population rates was even more dramatic. 
83.1 percent of the working age population was employed in 1990 but only 72.6 percent in 
1993. Unemployment has in Sweden as elsewhere turned out to be persistent. The 
recovery from the shocks of the early 1990s has been relatively slow and shaky. 
Unemployment in 1999 stood at 5.6 percent and 72.9 percent of the working age 
population was employed.1 
  The slump in the Swedish economy in the early 1990s resulted in a huge government 
budget deficit that paved the way for a number of policy decisions to cut expenditure and 
increase revenues through higher taxes. Unemployment insurance (UI) emerged as one of 
the targets for expenditure cutting. Unemployment compensation in Sweden has by 
international standards been generous; in the early 1990s, the maximum replacement rate 
among workers eligible for UI amounted to 90 percent of previous earnings. The fiscal 
crisis induced a sequence of decisions to make the UI system less generous and less 
expensive. The replacement rate was reduced to 80 percent the 1
st of July 1993 and was 
further reduced to 75 percent from the 1
st of January 1996 (a decision taken already in 
June 1995). It is noteworthy that the main motivation for benefit cuts has been the need to 
exercise fiscal restraint. Concerns about possible adverse incentive effects have not 
played a major role in the Swedish political debate. I ndeed, in the wake of fiscal 
consolidation in the late 1990s, a decision was taken to raise the UI replacement rate to 
80 percent from September 1, 1997.  
  The main purpose of this paper is to examine how the cut in replacement rates from 
80 to 75 percent  in January 1996 affected the job finding rates among unemployed 
workers. We make use of data with information on the length of individual unemployment 
spells, as well as a host of characteristics pertaining to the individual, the household and 
the labor market. The key strategy to identify the effect of the benefit reform is to exploit a 
quasi-experimental feature of the 1996 policy: only a fraction – albeit a majority – of 
unemployed insured workers was affected by the cut in the replacement rates. We 




and after the 1
st of January 1996 for those affected by the cut – the "treatment group" – 
with the escape rate for those who were not affected – the "control group". Our results 
suggest that the benefit cut increased the escape rate by about 10 percent, which is a 
relatively strong effect compared to what has been found in other studies. We also find 
evidence of anticipatory behavior among the unemployed: the effect of the cut in 
replacement rates appears to operate already several months  before its actual 
implementation in January 1996.2  
  We begin in the next section by describing the Swedish UI system and the changes that 
are of particular relevance for our study. Section 3 discusses some theoretical issues, 




2. Unemployment Compensation in Sweden 
The Swedish UI system is based on voluntary membership in union affiliated UI funds. 
These funds are subject to various government regulations, including rules concerning 
benefits levels. The government also heavily subsidizes the funds; in the early 1990s, 
these subsidies covered around 95 percent of paid-out benefits in the UI funds. There has 
been a trend increase in the coverage of UI. In the early 1990s, over 80 percent of workers 
counted as unemployed according to the labor force surveys were members of UI funds. 
The fraction actually eligible for UI was lower, however, the main reason being the fact 
that some members do not fulfill the work requirement for eligibility. On average some 65 
percent of the stock of unemployed registered at the employment exchange offices 
received UI during 1990-1995 (see SOU 1996:51, p. 51). The fraction of new spells of 
unemployment covered by UI was even lower. Carling et al (1996) report that only 43 
percent of the inflow during 1991 of new unemployed aged 16-54 received regular UI 
                                                                                                                                               
1 These numbers refer to the national definitions in the labor force surveys. 
2 The reason for our focus on the 1996-reform is that this change is most suitable to analyze as a quasi-
experiment. The 1993-change might also be analyzed as quasi-experiment if one is willing to regard 
workers without UI compensation as a control group, an approach adopted in Harkman (1997). However, 
this is problematic since the population eligible for UI face very different incentives than those not 
eligible. By focusing on insured workers we can thus compare treatment and control groups that are 
more similar than workers with and without UI compensation. Moreover, the data for this earlier period 
contain less information on personal characteristics. The data needed to analyze the policy change in 




compensation. The data set used for our present study  – based on the i nflow of 
unemployed during the mid-1990s  – reveals that 41 percent of the new spells were 
covered by UI. 
  A ceiling on the benefit level – 75 percent of 16 500 SEK per month in 1996 – means 
that actual compensation rates can be much lower than the maximum  rates. It has been 
estimated that 75 percent of all full-time employees had monthly earnings exceeding 16 
500 SEK in 1996 (see SOU 1996:51). However, the distribution of actual replacement 
rates among the unemployed may differ substantially from those figures, as low earnings 
are correlated with higher risks of unemployment. Slightly more than 70 percent of the 
insured unemployed workers in our data set had a compensation rate of 80 percent before 
1996; from 1996 and onwards, some 80 percent of the unemployed workers had a 
replacement rate at the new maximum of 75 percent.  
  Workers who are not members of UI funds may receive "cash assistance" (kontant 
arbetsmarknadsstöd, KAS). Compensation from KAS is much lower than UI benefits (40 
percent of the maximum compensation from UI in 1996). KAS is paid out for a maximum 
of 30 weeks (150 working days), whereas UI benefits are paid for 60 weeks (300 working 
days) for workers under age 55 and for 90 weeks (450 working days) for workers who 
are 55 or older. The benefit reform of 1995/1996 also involved a cut in KAS from 245 
SEK to 230 SEK per day.  
  Figure 1 illustrates how benefits (B) vary with earnings (W) for eligible workers in 
the mid-1990s. The maximum benefit level is 564 SEK per day, paid five days a week. 
With a replacement rate of 80 percent (before January 1996 – the solid line), this ceiling 
kicks in at a monthly pay of 15 510 SEK or 705 SEK per day (15 510/22). After the cut in 
the replacement rate from January 1996 and onwards (the dashed line), the ceiling kicks in 
at 16 544 SEK per month or 752 SEK per day. We can thus allocate the individuals into 
three groups, labeled T1, T2 and C in Figure 1. Group T1 includes people with 
replacement rates of exactly 80 percent before the change; group T2 consists of workers 
with pre-unemployment earnings in the interval 705 to 752 SEK; group C, finally, includes 
workers who were not affected by the cut in benefits. We will refer to T1 and T2 as 
"treatment groups" whereas C is the "control group". 
  In addition to these benefit cuts, some other changes were also introduced in January 




withdrawal of benefits. The period of benefit withdrawal for quitting "without good 
cause" was extended from 20 to 45 days from the 1
st of January 1996. Workers who 
repeatedly rejected suitable job offers could be exposed to a withdrawal of benefits of up 
to 80 days (compared to 20 days before January 1996).  
 









Note: The solid (dashed) line depicts the replacement rate before (after) January 1, 1996. 
 
 
3. Theoretical Issues 
The basic theory of how UI compensation affects job search is presented in Mortensen 
(1977). Other contributions include Burdett (1979), Mortensen (1990) and van den Berg 
(1990, 1994). The theory portrays an unemployed worker engaged in sequential search 
with the objective to maximize the present value of lifetime income (or utility). Mortensen 
allows f or fixed duration of benefit payments and stochastic duration of employment 
spells. There is also an eligibility condition requiring a certain amount of work experience 
in order to qualify for UI. The wage offer distribution is taken as stationary and known by 
the unemployed searcher. 
  The most important implications derived from this model are the following: First, the 
worker's reservation wage declines as he approaches the date at which benefits expire; 
hence the exit rate increases over the spell of (insured) unemployment. Second, an 
increase in the benefit level makes it more attractive for presently not eligible workers to 









result in an increase in the exit rate from unemployment to employment for workers who 
are not qualified for benefits, a response known as the "entitlement effect". Third, a rise in 
the benefit level will cause a newly unemployed and insured worker to increase his 
reservation wage but induce an insured worker close to benefit exhaustion to reduce his 
reservation wage. The exit rate thus declines for newly unemployed insured workers but 
increases for workers who have come close to benefit exhaustion. The last property 
follows from the fact that a higher benefit level increases both the value of continued 
search as unemployed and the value of accepting an offer. The immediate value of higher 
benefits is small for workers close to benefit exhaustion, as they are almost in the same 
situation as workers not qualified for UI. 
  The intriguing third prediction of this theory – that workers close to benefit exhaustion 
will respond to higher benefits by lowering the reservation wage – has rarely been tested 
in empirical research.3 It has been common to include measures of benefits or replacement 
rates without allowing for different effects between those who have just entered the 
unemployment pool and those who are close to benefit exhaustion. If the theory is correct, 
however, the estimates of benefit effects a re likely to be sensitive to the duration 
composition of the samples at hand.  
  The Swedish institutional setting raises some new issues. First, there is a question 
whether benefits have a fixed duration or if they in practice have unlimited duration. 
Active labor market programs have provided important escape routes from "open" 
unemployment. Since participation in these programs qualify for future benefit periods – 
and programs are targeted at the long term unemployed at risk of losing benefits – one 
might argue that benefit periods are in fact of unlimited length and there is then little 
reason to expect an increasing exit rate as benefit exhaustion is approached.4  
  A second issue is the possibility of anticipatory behavior when the policy change is 
known long in advance of its actual implementation. The decision to cut replacement rates 
from the 1
st of January 1996 was taken already in June 1995. Workers who were 
                                                 
3 The study by Katz and Meyer (1990) on U.S. data is an exception. The study does not find significant 
support for the prediction, however. 
4 The estimates in Carling et al (1996) on Swedish data lend some support for the hypothesis that the exit 
rate to employment does increase as insured workers approach benefit exhaustion, a result consistent 




unemployed during the second half of 1995 were presumably aware of the fact that a new 
benefit regime was to be implemented in January 1996.  
  How would, then, an anticipated cut in future benefits affect an unemployed worker's 
search behavior? Consider an insured worker who has just entered unemployment and 
assume for simplicity that benefits have unlimited duration. A future cut in benefits would 
be like introducing a two-tiered benefit system with an initial relatively high level 
followed by a subsequent lower level. The optimal response to such a known future 
benefit cut would be to choose a declining reservation wage path prior to the change and a 
constant reservation wage thereafter (absent other changes in the worker's environment). 
The exit rate would thus be increasing as the worker approaches the date at which the 
benefit level is cut. It is more complicated to characterize behavior if the benefit period is 
fixed. The effect of a future reduction in benefits may in general depend both on the time to 
the benefit cut and the time to benefit exhaustion.  
  These examples suggest that we should, in general, expect that the reforms that were 
implemented in January 1996 might have affected search behavior already during the 
second half of 1995. We will in our empirical analysis investigate whether there is any 
evidence of such anticipatory behavior among the unemployed. 
 
 
4. The Data 
We have combined a number of different data sources for the empirical analysis. The data 
are part of the so-called LINDA database, a register-based longitudinal database for 
Sweden.5 We use data on benefits from the UI funds and information on the length of spells 
on unemployment from the employment agencies. Survey evidence indicates that some 90 
percent of those who are unemployed according the labor force surveys also register at the 
public employment offices (Statistics Sweden, 1993). Moreover, we focus our analysis on 
those who are entitled to UI, a category for which registration at the employment offices is 
compulsory. The different data sets are merged as described briefly in Appendix B and in 
detail in an appendix available on request. We have also added data on local 
unemployment rates. 
                                                 




  Our sample is drawn from the inflow to the unemployment registers during 24 months 
during three years: 1994 (the last six months), 1995 (all twelve months) and 1996 (the first 
six months). We follow the individuals until they escape unemployment or, at the most, 
until July 1997. The sampling procedure resulted in 45 125 individuals. 22 265 of those 
had neither UI compensation nor KAS, 2 384 received KAS and 20 476 received regular 
UI compensation. We decided to focus the analysis on those entitled to regular UI, thereby 
avoiding the need to address selectivity issues with respect to the choice of becoming 
insured. A further limitation was to set the upper age limit to 54 and to exclude workers 
with reported health problems. The reason for the age limit is that older workers (aged 55 
or older) were entitled to 450 days of unemployment compensation (compared to 300 days 
for those aged 54 or less). Differences in the maximum duration of benefit payments may 
have consequences for search behavior over the spell of unemployment and hence for the 
evolution of the escape rate to employment.  
  The resulting sample contained 18 429 individuals. Table 1 gives descriptive 
statistics on a variety of characteristics for individuals in this sample, whereas Table 2 
describes the distribution of replacement rates. Spell characteristics are displayed in 
Table 3. Table 1 is largely self-explanatory. The individuals in the control group are on 
average older, better educated and have higher wages as well as higher non-labor income 
than people in the treatment groups. It is notable that the fraction of women is 66 percent 
of the T1 group, i.e., the group with earnings below the 1995 ceiling of 705 SEK per day. 
The control group, by contrast, includes only 16 percent women.  
  The distribution of replacement rates is highly compressed in this sample, as shown 
in Table 2. Before 1996, 72 percent received the statutory maximum of 80 percent, and 16 
percent received a replacement rate in the interval 70-80 percent. Only 12 percent 
received less than 70 percent. After the 1996-reform, 80 percent received the maximum of 
75 percent. The duration pattern of the spells, shown in Table 3, reveals that almost 60 
percent of the spells end within three months. Only 10 percent of the spells last for more 
than a year. Almost 50 percent of the spells are escaped through transitions to regular 




          Table 1. Sample characteristics (means). 




   32.4 
  
  36.1 
 
   37.5 
Female    0.664    0.268    0.165 
Foreign citizen: Nordic    0.026    0.023    0.021 
Foreign citizen: Non-Nordic    0.045    0.021    0.012 
Cohabitant    0.115    0.154    0.131 
Married    0.459    0.522    0.581 
Children, 15 yrs old or less     0.636    0.521    0.520 
Children, 16 yrs old or more    0.066    0.077    0.093 
Education and work experience 
9 yrs or less 
 




  0.199 
High school, 2 yrs    0.417    0.479    0.489 
High school, 3 yrs     0.144    0.098    0.104 
University, 1-3 yrs     0.149    0.112    0.113 
University, 4 yrs or more    0.062    0.087    0.092 
No work experience    0.156    0.085    0.047 
Some work experience    0.312    0.198    0.121 
Long work experience    0.501    0.707    0.821 
Previous wage and non-labor 
income 
Wage per day (month), SEK 
 
  560.2 (12 324) 
 
  729.3 (16 045) 
 
  854.5 (18 799) 
Income of spouse (SEK per month)   5514   6022   6241 
Income from capital (SEK per month)     77     111     153 
# individuals  13 330  1 396  3 703 
Notes: The sample is restricted to workers with regular unemployment compensation who are 
less than 55 years old. Experience refers to work experience in the occupation within which the 




Table 2. The distribution of replacement rates before 1996. 
Replacement rate  % 
0.80  72.33 
[0.775, 0.80)  3.10 
[0.75, 0.775)  5.34 
[0.725, 0.75)  3.83 
[0.70, 0.725)  3.75 
[0.65, 0.70)  5.71 
[0.60, 0.65)  3.05 
[0.50, 0.60)  2.17 
[0.40, 0.50)  0.62 
< 0.40  0.076 
 
 
Table 3. Spell characteristics. 
Mean duration (months)  5.4 
Proportion of spells lasting more than:   
  30 days  (1 month)  90.6 
  60 days  (2 months)  76.6 
  120 days  (3 months)  43.4 
  180 days  (6 months)  28.4 
  360 days  (12 months)  6.2 
  420 days  (14 months)  3.7 
Proportion of spells ending in:   
  regular employment  46.8 
  labor market program  23.8 
  labor force exit  24.3 
  lost contact  4.4 
Censored  0.8 




market programs.6 The category "lost contact", consists of workers with uncertain 
destination state as the employment office has lost contact with them. An earlier follow-up 
study of "lost contact" individuals by Bring and Carling (1994) found that roughly 50 
percent of them actually were employed. We assume in the empirical analysis that these 
workers found a job at the attrition date. 
  The evolution of the empirical job finding rates for the C and T1 groups are shown in 
Figure 2.7 The rates are computed for time intervals of four weeks. There is a phase with 
increasing exit rates during the first months of unemployment, followed by a phase of 
declining rates. The exit rates start to increase after around 50 weeks of elapsed 
unemployment. It is tempting to interpret the rising hazard after 50 weeks as being driven 
by the risk of benefit exhaustion. However, this can be no more than a speculation absent a 
control group that is not exposed to benefit exhaustion after 60 weeks. Note that the figure 
is based on data for individual spells that are pooled irrespective of when the spells 
started. It thus shows the "cross-sectional" differences between hazard rates for control 
and treatment groups but contains no information on the pre- and post-reform evolution of 
these rates. We will provide a before-after comparison of hazard rates as we proceed.  
 












                                                 
6 The distinction between labor market programs and labor force exits is not quite conventional. 
According to the labor force surveys, participation in labor market programs usually means that the 
person is classified as being outside the labor force. 
7 The hazard rate for the T2 group has basically the same pattern as the rates shown in Figure 2. We show 
















5. Empirical Analysis 
5.1 Empirical Strategy 
Many studies  concerned with the effects of unemployment benefits on unemployment 
duration have made use of data on unemployment spells with cross sectional variations in 
benefit receipt.8 This approach is susceptible to the criticism that the estimates may be 
biased due to unobserved characteristics that are correlated with the amount of benefit 
receipt. We therefore proceed by exploiting a feature of the 1996-reform that is close to a 
natural experiment.  
  Recall that the cut in replacement rates did not affect all unemployed workers. 
Referring to Figure 1, there are two "treatment groups". The first one (T1) is the group 
with replacement rates of exactly 80 percent before the change, whereas the second (T2) 
consists of workers with  W˛ ( , ) 705752 . Both groups  experienced cuts in the 
replacement rates, but the cuts in the rates were smaller for T2 than for T1. The "control 
group", finally, consists of workers who were not affected by the cut, i.e., those with 
earnings equal to or exceeding the new ceiling of 752 SEK. As shown by Table 1, there 
are 13 330 persons in T1, 1396 in T2 and 3703 in C. 
  The general strategy for estimating the effect of the benefit reform is to examine the 
evolution of the hazard rates for the treatment groups and the control group before and 
after the policy change.9 If the hazard rate for a treatment group increases more (declines 
less) than the hazard rate for the control group around the 1
st of January 1996, then we 
conclude that the reform increased the hazard rate.  
  We begin by a simple comparison of the job finding rates before and after the policy 
change in January 1996. We compare the empirical hazard rates for the control group and 
the largest treatment group (T1), separating pre-reform spells (beginning before the policy 
change) and post-reform spells (beginning after the change). Specifically, we compare 
spells that started between January and mid-May 1995 (pre-reform spells) with spells that 
started between January and mid-May 1996 (post-reform spells). The time intervals are 
                                                 
8 There are a large number of studies in this area. The paper by Lancaster and Nickell (1980) is an early 
and representative example. The available surveys include the book by Devine and Kiefer (1991) and the 
papers by Atkinson and Micklewright (1991), Pedersen and Westergård Nielsen (1993) and Holmlund 
(1998).  
9 Meyer (1989), Hunt (1995) and Steiner (1997) have adopted a similar methodology in studies of 




chosen so as to avoid distortions due to seasonal effects. The hazard rates are calculated 
for the first 36 weeks.  
  Figure 3 shows the results of the calculations.10 The policy change is associated with  
a substantial decline in  the C-hazard,  whereas the  T1-hazard  increases  slightly during 
 


























Note: The shaded area corresponds to the "sample window" for our  unemployment  spells.  
Source: The National Labour Market Board.  
 
                                                 
10 The empirical hazard functions are quite rough and have therefore been smoothed by a scatterplot 


























the first quarter. A crude "difference-in-difference" estimate of the effect of the policy 
change suggests an increase in the hazard rate of approximately 0.018, or 18 percent if 
applied to a job finding rate of 0.10 per four-week period.11 When interpreting this figure, 
it is important to recognize that we compare two time periods with somewhat different 
labor market conditions. The period 1995–1996  is characterized by a weakening of 
overall economic activity, resulting in a substantial fall in the number of new vacancies 
notified to the employment offices (see Figure 4). With this evolution of labor demand 
conditions, some decline in job finding rates should be expected. The surprising part of 
Figure 3 is the absence of a decline in job finding rates among workers in treatment group 
T1.12 All in all, the evidence from this crude before-after comparison suggests that the 
policy change may have caused an increase in job finding rates. 
  We proceed to discuss the empirical specification. The difference-in-difference 
procedure can be described as follows, assuming for the moment that there is only one 
treatment group. Let  h t ( )  denote the hazard rate and consider the equation: 
 
(1)    ( ) ( )
96 96
0 ); ( , exp ) ( ) ( t
T T
t D D D D t z x m t h t h ￿ ￿ + ￿ + ￿ + W = l g d . 
 
  The baseline hazard,  h t 0( ), is taken to be identical for the treatment and control 
groups.  m( ) ￿  is a function that links time-constant covariates,  x, and time-varying 
covariates, z(t), to the hazard rate, and W is a vector of parameters corresponding to the 
covariates. 
96
t D  is a time-varying dummy, where  0
96 = t D  prior to January 1996 and 
1
96 = t D  thereafter.  D
T is a dummy for the treatment group. The effect of the cut in the 
replacement rate is obtained by comparing the hazard rates for the treatment and the 
control groups before and after the 1
st of January 1996. The effect of the policy change is 
given by the coefficient on the interaction variable, i.e., l . 
  This difference-in-difference approach is not without pitfalls. Suppose, for example, 
that labor market opportunities develop differently for the two groups around the time of 
                                                 
11 The mean difference between the post- and pre-hazard for the C-group is –0.0166, whereas the 
analogous mean difference for the T1-group is 0.0016.  
12 There appear to be relatively small differences between the pre- and post-categories in terms of their 
human capital characteristics. The real wage increases by 1.6 percent for the T1-group whereas it falls 




the policy change, thus causing an upward shift in the hazard for one group and a 
downward shift for the other group. A negative bias in the estimated effect is obtained if 
the demand for skilled labor – typically at the benefit ceiling and therefore in the control 
group  – increases relative to the demand for less skilled workers (typically in the 
treatment group). A positive bias is obtained if the opposite development of relative labor 
market opportunities occurs. It thus becomes important to assess the extent to which such 
divergent changes in labor market conditions have taken place during this period.  
  We have information on two treatment groups and will exploit information on both, 
recognizing that workers in group T2 experienced cuts in replacement rates that were 
smaller than those experienced by workers in T1. Let R denote the replacement rate prior 
to the benefit reform and consider the following specification: 
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  We control for time effects by the time dummy and for group differences by means of 
the dummies for the two treatment groups, i.e.,  D
T1  and  D
T2 . The specification 
presupposes that it is changes in replacement rates that matter for behavior. The effect for 
those around W=705, and hence  R » 080 . , should be the same irrespective of whether 
they are just above or just below the initial ceiling. Analogously, the effect for those 
around  W= 752, and hence  R » 075 . , should be the same irrespective of whether they 
are located to the left or to the right of the 1996-ceiling. The variable ( . ) / . R- 075 005 is 
thus located in the interval (0,1). We let DPOL denote the interaction terms capturing the 
policy change, i.e.,  
 
(3)   
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  The effect of the benefit reform is given by the coefficient in front of the interaction 
terms in (2), i.e.,  b. Note that the policy change involved a cut in the replacement rate of 





5.2 Empirical Results 
The results of the estimations are given in Table 4. The baseline hazard is estimated non-
parametrically for each four-week interval. Appendix A presents the statistical model and 
the estimates  of the baseline hazard (for the model in the fourth column) are given in 
Appendix C. As mentioned, individuals in the "lost contact" category are treated as if they 
entered employment at the attrition date. Our results are basically the same if we 
alternatively treat these subjects as right-censored.  
  The variable of main interest is DPOL in the fourth line of the table. The estimates of 
its coefficient,  b, vary between .095 and .117; the estimated effect of the benefit cut on 
the job finding rate is thus roughly 10 percent. The specifications in column (3) and (4) 
clearly outperform the more restrictive specifications in the first two columns; most of the 
demographic characteristics and some education and experience variables are significant. 
The t-values for the estimated effects are 2.1 and 2.0, respectively, in the two right-most 
columns. Our conclusion, then, is that the benefit cut appears to have increased the 
transition rate to employment.13 
  Among the other variables, we note that the coefficient on the dummy for treatment 
group T1 is significantly negative, which confirms the picture given already by the raw 
hazards in Figure 2. The coefficient on T2 is insignificantly different from zero. The time 
dummy is significantly negative, as should be expected given the evolution of labor 
demand conditions over the period. The local unemployment rate has a negative effect, 
although only marginally significant. The demographic variables have in general 
significant coefficients. The job finding rate is decreasing in age, with an increase in age 
of 10 year being associated with a fall in the hazard of about 10 percent. Women have 
substantially lower escape rates than men; the difference is over 20 percent. This pattern 
is very different from the results in Carling et al (1996), where the escape rate to 
employment were estimated to be higher for women than for men. The precise reasons for 
these differences are unclear, but may reflect different labor market conditions associated 
with  the  sample periods, i.e., the early  1990s in the  previous study  as opposed  to  the  
                                                 
13 We have tested whether pooling of the two treatment groups is valid by adding an additional free 
parameter for the T2-group, appropriately scaled by the change in the replacement rate as in eq. (3). The 
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-.214  .046 
 
-.178  .047 
 
-.179  .048 
 
-.181  .048 
         
1 T D   -.330  .028  -.325  .028  -.152  .031  -.126  .041 
         
2 T D   -.003  .040  -.004  .040  -.004  .040  +.006  .041 
         
DPOL  .095  .056  .095  .057  .117  .057  .116  .057 
         
 



















         
Local unemployment rate     -.779  .397  -.694  .399  -.684  .399 
         
Demographic characteristics 
Age 
     
-.010  .002 
 
-.010  .002 
Female      -.224  .025  -.221  .025 
         
Foreign citizen: Nordic       -.067  .069  -.067  .070 
Foreign citizen: Non-Nordic      -.482  .068  -.478  .068 
         
Cohabitant      .034  .034  .046  .050 
Married      .116  .027  .128  .043 
         
Children, 15 yrs old or less      -.195  .025  -.192  .026 
Children, 16 yrs old or more      .151  .040  .153  .040 
         
Education and work experience 
Less than 9 yrs 
     
-.039  .152 
 
-.041  .152 
9 yrs      -.074  .148  -.077  .148 
High school, 2 yrs       .049  .147  .045  .147 
High school, 3 yrs      -.002  .149  -.007  .149 
University, 1-3 yrs       .055  .149  .048  .149 
University, 4 yrs       .286  .150  .278  .150 
         
No work experience       .414  .098  .413  .098 
Some work experience      .606  .094  .605  .094 
Long work experience      .701  .093  .699  .093 
         
Previous wage and non-labor income 
ln wage 
       
.067  .070 
ln (1 + income from capital)        .002  .005 
ln (1+ income of spouse)        -.002  .005 
         
ln L  29 886.1  29 737.9  29 499.2  29 498.5 
Notes: There are 18 429 spells. The regional dummies are dummies for counties (län). The reference 
individual is a single male Swedish citizen in the control group. He has no children and has missing 




mid-1990s in the present one.14 Note also that this paper uses a sample that is restricted to 
insured workers, whereas all categories of unemployed were pooled in the previous 
study. 
  The fact that women appear to have much lower exit rates than men has motivated us 
to estimate separate models for men and women. The precision of these estimates (not 
reported) is generally lower, as should be expected. The benefit effects are not 
significantly different between the two groups15, but the effects of children are. Having 
small children means a 30 percent lower exit rate for women but only 10 percent lower 
rate for men. The pattern is reversed for older children: having older children is 
associated with a 25 percent higher exit rate for women whereas the effect is only 5 
percent for men.  
  Among other results reported in Table 4, we note that non-Nordic immigrants have 
job f inding rates that are more than 40 percent lower than the exit rates for Swedish 
citizens. Better education is not uniformly associated with higher escape rates, although a 
long university education appears to make a significant difference. Improved work 
experience has the expected positive effects. Finally, we find no significant effects of the 
previous wage and non-labor income, where non-labor income includes the person's 
income from capital and the income of the spouse.16 
  We have also investigated whether there is any effect of the policy change on exit 
rates to labor market programs and to non-participation. A cut in benefits is likely to raise 
the exit rates to non-participation since the value of unemployment declines relative to the 
value of being outside the labor force. Under the assumption of independent risks, a 
competing risk model can be estimated by treating exits to states other than that of interest 
                                                 
14 The unemployment rate according to the labor force surveys was constant for males (8.4 percent) 
between 1995 and 1997, whereas it increased from 6.9 to 7.6 percent for females during the same 
period.  
15 In a model with interactions between DPOL and the female dummy we obtain an estimate of the main 
effect of 0.123 (with standard error 0.062). The estimated parameter for the interaction variable is –
0.010 (with standard error 0.040). The implied estimates for males and females are thus 0.123 and 
0.113, respectively, with a standard error of 0.081 for females. The large standard error for females 
appears to be due to the fact that there are relatively few women in the C-group. 
16 The lack of significance for the previous wage is perhaps not so surprising recognizing that we control 
for a number of personal characteristics of the individuals. Non-labor income would have no effect on 
workers' search behavior if they only cared about income, in which case the difference  between the 
value of employment and the value of unemployment would be unaffected by changes in non-labor 
income. In general, however, we would expect that non-labor income reduces effective labor supply, i.e., 




as censored observations at the relevant point in time.17 Table 5 shows the results of the 
estimations. We find no significant effect of the policy change on exits to labor market 
programs and non-participation.  
  Other results are more in line with what we would expect. We note, for example, that 
workers in T1 are much more likely to leave the labor force than the other groups. 
Transition rates to non-participation are also higher among women and among young 
workers as well as among persons with small children. The local unemployment rate has a 
very strong positive effect on the exit rate to labor market programs and also a positive 
effect on exits to non-participation.  
 
5.3 Discussion 
Comparisons with other studies 
How large is the estimated effect of the benefit cut compared to the results of earlier 
studies? Layard et al (1991) characterize the literature as follows (p. 255): "The basic 
result is that the elasticity of the expected duration with respect to benefits is generally in 
the range 0.2-0.9 depending on the state of the labour market and the country concerned, 
although estimates as low as 0 (Atkinson et al. 1984) and as high as 3.3 (Ridder and 
Gorter 1986) may be found". Our implied elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to 
benefits is about 1.6, which is on the high side compared to most of the results reported in 
previous research.18  
  Lancaster and Nickell (1980) reviewed some of the early empirical work in this field 
and concluded that the size of the effect of benefits on the exit rate from unemployment is 
"now a rather firmly established parameter". This conclusion was surely premature, as has 
been revealed by subsequent studies with rather diverse results. One can ask whether 
there is any systematic relationship between the adopted methodology and the magnitude 
                                                 
17 Models that incorporate transitions from unemployment to non-participation are, for example, 
presented in Toikka (1976) and Flinn and Heckman (1982). One can think of non-participation as a state 
associated with a utility flow of non-market opportunities, subject to stochastic change. Changes in 
benefits affect the "non-market reservation utility", i.e., the value of non-market time that makes the 
unemployed worker indifferent between unemployment and non-participation. 
18 The 5 percent cut in the replacement rate corresponds to a 6.25 percent reduction in benefits 
(5/80=.0625). If the rise in the hazard is taken to be 10 percent, the implied elasticity is 1.6 (10/6.25). 
Of course, the elasticity of the expected duration is equivalent to the elasticity of the hazard rate only in 











Exits to labor  
market programs 
(2) 





t D  
 
-.181  .048 
 
.079  .070 
 
-.628  .121 
       
1 T D   -.126  .041  +.099  .068  +.492  .075 
       
2 T D   +.006  .041  +.051  .073  +.175  .093 
       
DPOL  .116  .057  .078  .077  -.043  .128 
 
Local unemployment rate   -.684  .399  2.263  .574  .185  .093 




-.010  .002 
 
-.007  .002 
 
-.030  .003 
Female  -.221  .025  -.071  .037  .484  .040 
       
Foreign citizen: Nordic   -.067  .070  .012  .093  -.017  .098 
Foreign citizen: Non-Nordic  -.478  .068  .008  .073  -.025  .077 
       
Cohabitant  .046  .050  .052  .072  .051  .071 
Married  .128  .043  .002  .061  .091  .060 
       
Children, 15 yrs old or less  -.192  .026  .016  .040  .171  .041 
Children, 16 yrs old or more  .153  .040  .099  .062  .120  .067 
       
Education and work experience 
Less than 9 yrs 
 
-.041  .152 
 
.221  .193 
 
-.086  .220 
9 yrs  -.077  .148  .318  .184  .081  .210 
High school, 2 yrs   .045  .147  .410  .182  .019  .209 
High school, 3 yrs  -.007  .149  .498  .184  .109  .211 
University, 1-3 yrs   .048  .149  .238  .187  .702  .210 
University, 4 yrs   .278  .150  .240  .193  .389  .215 
       
No work experience   .413  .098  .479  .101  -.056  .076 
Some work experience  .605  .094  .441  .098  -.080  .072 
Long work experience  .699  .093  .289  .097  -.154  .071 
       




.067  .070 
 
.114  .099 
 
.135  .111 
ln (1 + income from capital)  .002  .005  .000  .008  .012  .008 
ln (1+ income of spouse)  -.002  .005  -.007  .007  -.027  .007 
       
Proportion exiting  0.512  0.238  0.243 
ln L  29 498.5  16 003.4  14 137.4 
Notes: There are 18 429 spells. The reference individual is a single male Swedish citizen in the control 
group. He has no children and has missing values on education and work experience. Column (1) is 






of the estimated effects. There seems to be no clear pattern here. Hunt (1995) uses a 
difference-in-difference approach close to the one in the present paper and finds no robust 
effects of benefit cuts in Germany (although she does find significant and substantial 
disincentive effects of extended benefit entitlement periods). By contrast, the papers on 
benefit sanctions in the Netherlands – Abbring et al (1998) and van den Berg et al (1998) 
– report very strong incentive effects of benefit cuts.19 
  The Swedish study most comparable to the present one is Harkman (1997). Harkman 
examined the effects of the cut in replacement rates from 90 to 80 percent in 1993 by a 
methodology similar to the one adopted here. Cox proportional hazard models were 
estimated on a data set that included both workers with UI compensation and workers 
without UI, with the former category serving as the treatment group and the latter as the 
control. The study found generally significant increases in the exit rate from unemployment 
at the time of the benefit cut, with a stronger effect on transitions to non-participation (28 
percent) than on transitions to employment (7 percent and an only marginally significant 
effect).  
  A major difference between Harkman's results and ours is thus that he found 
significant and substantial effects on exits to non-participation, whereas we have been 
unable to detect any effect on this escape route. The reasons for the different results can 
only be a matter of speculation. Our focus on workers with UI compensation means that 
we analyze a group with a relatively strong labor force attachment. The participation 
decisions of this group may well be relatively insensitive to benefit changes. 
 
Does the benefit effect vary by age? 
Our basic specification imposes the same benefit effect across all groups of workers. 
Earlier studies, such as Narendranathan et al (1985), have found that the benefit effect 
tends to be stronger for young workers. One conjecture, given in Narendranathan et al, is 
that the effect is stronger because the wage offer distribution probably is more compressed 
for young workers. A given change in the reservation wage has a stronger effect on the exit 
rate if the wage offer distribution is very dense in the relevant region. We have checked 
for possible age differences in the benefit effect by a number of alternative specifications. 
                                                 
19 The estimates imply that temporary benefit cuts in the interval of 5 to 30 percent cause increases in 




Table 6 shows results for a specification with age dummies and interactions with DPOL 
and the age dummies. The results are clear: the benefit cut does seem to have had a larger 
impact on the job finding rates among young workers (under 25) than for the rest of the 
unemployed. The difference between the effect for the young and the reference group (aged 
25-44) is over 20 percent.20 The precise reason for these differences between age groups 
remains as a largely open question, however.21  
 
     Table 6. Benefit effects by age. 











25-44 (reference group)  0      0   
45-54  -.087  .032    -.050  .036 
DPOL  .115  .056    .083  .058 
(Under 25)·DPOL        .108  .040 
(45-54)·DPOL        -.019  .041 





We have briefly mentioned possible pitfalls associated with the difference in difference 
approach, such as omitted controls for divergent labor market opportunities among 
treatment and control groups. Indeed, the distribution of wages among treatment and 
control groups differs  substantially and the  labor markets  for these groups  may have  
                                                                                                                                               
estimates are reported for exits out of welfare. 
20 The effect for young workers (under 25) is 0.191 (with standard error 0.082), whereas the effect for 
old workers is 0.064 (with standard error 0.078). We have also estimated hazard models for the three 
age groups separately. The results (not reported) are very similar to those displayed in Table 6. 
21 We have also tried to test the hypothesis that the benefit effect varies by elapsed duration, a 
prediction derived by Mortensen (1977). The test involves including interactions between DPOL and the 
hazard. The results (not reported) do not give any support for the hypothesis that the benefit effects are 
attenuated (or reversed in sign) at long durations; in fact, the results tend to suggest that the effects are 




evolved very differently around the time of the benefit reform. To address this issue, we 
have undertaken a sensitivity analysis so as to check whether the results are robust to 
changes in the composition of the treatment and control groups. In particular, we have 
successively eliminated cases with the lowest wages in the T1-group and the highest 
wages in the control group, thereby reducing the heterogeneity of the sample with respect 
to pre-unemployment wages. We excluded 5, 10, 20, and 50 percent of the lowest wages 
in the T1-group and analogously (and simultaneously) 5, 10, 20 and 50 percent of the 
highest wages in the control group. The outcome of this exercise is shown in Table 7, 
where the results for the full sample are replicated for comparison. There is no evidence 
that the estimated effect is much affected by excluding workers at the bottom and the top of 
the wage distribution. 
  As a crude check for divergent labor market opportunities among treatment and 
control groups, we have examined employment-to-population rates by educational groups 
(Figure 5). If our estimated benefit effect is due to divergent labor market opportunities, 
the implication would be that these opportunities have become relatively more favorable 
for the less educated over the period 1994-1997 (since the less educated are typically in 
the treatment groups due to lower earnings). Figure 5 gives little support for this 
possibility; if anything, the data suggest the reverse. Indeed, there is a widespread view 
that the demand for labor in the wake of the computer revolution has become "skill-
biased", i.e., favoring the better skilled relative to the less skilled in the labor force. It 
seems unlikely that our estimated effect is biased upwards for reasons of unobserved 
favorable trends in the relative labor demand of less skilled workers.  
 
Anticipatory effects 
The benefit cut was decided already in June 1995, i.e., over half a year before the actual 
implementation of the policy in January 1996.22 Is there any evidence of anticipatory 
behavior among the unemployed during the months preceding January 1996? We have 
investigated this issue by redefining the time dummy so that it kicks in already during a 
sequence of months (four-week periods) in the second half of 1995. Figure 6 illustrates the 
results of this exercise. There  is  clear evidence that the effect operates several months 
                                                                                                                                               
reversal of the benefit effect if benefits are paid forever, which arguably is the case in Sweden because 




before the law change came into force. This pattern lends additional support to the claim 
that the benefit reform did in fact affect search behavior among the unemployed.  
 
      Table 7. The effects of excluding workers with high and low wages. 
  Estimated effect ( b )  Standard error 
Fraction of T1 and C excluded 





 5 %  .087  .063 
10 %  .078  .064 
20 %  .097  .068 
50 %  .118  .070 
        Note: The specification of column (4) in Table 4 is used. 
 
 














Source: Labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden. 
                                                                                                                                               







Figure 6. Anticipatory effects of the benefit cut, i.e., estimates of  b for weeks 
prior to the 1

















Notes: The benefit cut was decided in June 1995 and implemented in January 1996. The estimates 
correspond to the specification in column (4) of Table 4. The time dummy is successively redefined and 
set equal to unity for up to 10 four-week intervals prior to the 1
st of January 1996. The standard errors 
are about 0.05, deviating at most by 0.005. 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Our study of the benefit cut that came into force in 1996 has yielded a fairly clear result. 
The reduction in the replacement rate from 80 to 75 percent had a significant positive 
effect on the transition rate from unemployment to employment. The magnitude of the effect 
– a 10 increase in the exit rate – is relatively large compared to the results from earlier 
studies. The decision on the benefit cut was taken half a year before it was actually 
implemented and we find evidence of anticipatory behavior among the unemployed: there 
is an increase in job finding rates already several months before the law change came into 
force. In contrast to some other studies we do not find any effects on transitions to non-
participation. 
  Would it be appropriate to conclude from our results that a more aggressive benefit 






Weeks prior to the reform




are reasons to pause before jumping to this conclusion. One issue concerns the nature of 
Swedish unemployment in the early 1990s and the shocks that caused it. There is little 
doubt than the main shock was a severe contraction of aggregate demand, in which case a 
large cut of benefits may be a two-edged instrument; the positive incentive effects on the 
supply side have to be weighed against adverse effects on aggregate demand induced by a 
fall in private consumption. Another issue is whether partial equilibrium results, as those 
obtained in this paper, are offset or reinforced in general equilibrium. There is no general 
theoretical presumption here, the answer being sensitive to the details of the model of 
equilibrium unemployment. There is a compelling argument that more generous benefits 
will raise wage pressure in economies where wage bargaining is pervasive, thus 
reinforcing the adverse incentive effects on job search. In models where wages are set by 
firms, however, the partial equilibrium results may sometimes be  offset in general 
equilibrium; see Albrecht and Axell (1984) and Axell and Lang (1990). 
  This being said, the bulk of the empirical studies on aggregate data suggest that high 
replacement rates do contribute to high unemployment. For example, the results presented 
in Nickell (1998), based on a panel of 20 OECD countries, imply that a 10 percentage 
point increase in the replacement rate would raise unemployment by 13 percent, 
corresponding to an increase in the average EU unemployment rate in the late 1990s by 
roughly one percentage point. The estimates by Scarpetta (1996) are fairly similar. The 
exact relationship between these macro-estimates and the microeconometric estimates of 
benefit effects on hazard rates is, however, a largely unresolved issue. 
  The quasi-experimental design of the benefit reform we have investigated is due to 
the presence of a ceiling  on the level of benefits. Existing UI systems often involve a 
benefit maximum of this sort, thus offering flat-rate benefits to workers with relatively 
high earnings and a constant replacement rate for the rest. The rationale for this kind of 
two-tiered benefit schedule does not appear to have been analyzed in the normative UI 
literature. It would be interesting to see whether future theoretical work on UI design can 
shed some light on the optimal structure of replacement rates, with explicit recognition of 









The Statistical Model 
Let the random variable  T  be the duration of unemployment until exit and define an 
indicator variable c that takes the value of unity if the exit occurred to the state of interest 
and zero otherwise. The model to be estimated is24 
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where  ) ( 0 t h  is the baseline hazard and  (.) m some function which links the control 
variables to the duration variable with the finite set of unknown parameters W. The policy 
variable is defined as  { }
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  The functional form of m(.) was chosen after some exploratory data analysis using 
complete observations only, i.e., observations where the actual duration was observed.25 
The log likelihood function, with m(.) given as  2 1 ) ( (.) v v t z x m + = , for a sample of n 
random complete and incomplete observations on T  and c is 
 
 
                                                 
23 See Casamatta et al (2000) for an interesting analysis of the political economy of social insurance in 
a model with heterogeneous individuals but without labor market distortions. 
24 See Meyer (1990), Narendranathan and Stewart (1993), and Carling et al. (1996) for earlier 
applications of this model. 
25 The precise relationship between the duration and the control variables is a priori unknown. The aim 
of the exploratory data analysis is to find transformations of the control variables that permit an additive 
structure of the model, thereby reducing the bias due to mis-specification. Altman and de Stavola (1994) 
provide a careful discussion of available techniques for duration models. Exploratory tools for ordinal 
and categorical variables are treated by Hoaglin, Mosteller, and Tukey (1985). For literature on non-
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where  1 = i c  if the duration was observed to be terminated due to exit to the state of 
interest. The function is maximized with respect to its arguments.26 The baseline hazard is 




APPENDIX B  
 
The Data 
We have combined several different data sources for the empirical analysis. Three 
sources are included in LINDA, a register-based longitudinal database for Sweden.27 
These three sources are HÄNDEL, AKSTAT and IoF. HÄNDEL originates from the 
public employment agencies in Sweden and contains information on spells of 
unemployment, participation in labor market programs as well as some personal 
characteristics. AKSTAT includes information on benefits for unemployed individuals 
who are entitled to regular UI or KAS. IoF contains information on income and wealth as 
well as a host of data on personal and household characteristics. We have merged these 
data sources and appended the data with information on local unemployment rates. A 
detailed documentation is available on request.  
  HÄNDEL is the basic data source for the construction of unemployment spells. Our 
basic rule for sample inclusion is that the person entered unemployment during the 24-
month period starting in July 1994 and ending in June 1996. We follow each person until 
the date of exit from unemployment or - if no exit is observed - until July 1997. 
  AKSTAT originates from the UI funds and includes only individuals with 
unemployment compensation (regular UI benefits or KAS). Among other things, AKSTAT 
includes information on previous earnings, the amount of benefit that the individual is 
entitled to and the type of benefit. We restrict our analysis to insured workers and thus 
require matching information from AKSTAT. We merge data from HÄNDEL and LINDA 
and then undertake a further merge with the IoF-data in LINDA. The variables from 
HÄNDEL that we use to identify entries to and exits from unemployment have no exact 
                                                 
26 Starting values are obtained from the Approximate Maximum Likelihood method (Carling, 1995), and 
used in conjunction with the BHHH algorithm (see Carling and Söderberg, 1998). 




counterparts in AKSTAT. The basic strategy is to use the information from HÄNDEL to 
determine unemployment status and the length of unemployment spells. We next searched 
for information on benefits and previous wages in AKSTAT for each individual during 
their weeks of unemployment. HÄNDEL and  AKSTAT have in common a personal 
identity code.  
  We include in the analysis two time-varying variables related to nonwage income, 
namely income from capital and the income of the spouse (if spouse is present). These 
two income measures are constructed from variables in the IoF data. The labor market 
conditions are measured at the municipality level. The local unemployment rate is defined 
as u=(U+P)/(U+P+E), where U is the number of persons registered as unemployed at the 
employment agencies,  P the number of persons in labor market programs, and E the 
number of employed in the municipality. The unemployment rate is treated as time varying 












Exits to labor 
market programs 
Exits to non- 
participation 
1-4  -3.253  0.498  -6.463  0.705  -4.957  0.771 
5-8  -2.826  0.498  -5.626  0.703  -4.023  0.768 
9-12  -2.687  0.497  -5.202  0.703  -2.599  0.766 
13-16  -2.729  0.498  -4.936  0.703  -2.358  0.766 
17-20  -2.752  0.498  -4.914  0.702  -3.378  0.769 
21-24  -2.710  0.498  -4.892  0.703  -3.486  0.770 
25-28  -2.675  0.498  -4.775  0.704  -3.385  0.770 
29-32  -2.715  0.499  -4.684  0.704  -3.230  0.771 
33-36  -2.803  0.500  -4.601  0.706  -2.891  0.771 
37-40  -2.924  0.501  -4.507  0.705  -3.056  0.773 
41-44  -2.817  0.501  -4.414  0.706  -3.247  0.777 
45-48  -3.116  0.505  -4.484  0.706  -2.891  0.776 
49-52  -2.953  0.504  -4.395  0.706  -3.087  0.779 
53-56  -2.928  0.507  -4.370  0.707  -2.973  0.778 
57-60  -2.608  0.506  -3.938  0.706  -2.928  0.784 
61-64  -2.405  0.507  -3.611  0.706  -2.539  0.785 
65-68  -2.332  0.515  -3.847  0.713  -2.335  0.787 
69-72  -2.362  0.524  -4.321  0.728  -2.446  0.799 
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